BIS Working Paper 1046, CBDC design, and monetary policy pass-through: inside a central bank’s digital-money build

BIS Working Paper 1046, CBDC design, and monetary policy pass-through: inside a central bank's digital-money build

BIS Working Paper 1046, CBDC design, and monetary policy pass-through sit inside a central bank's digital-money work. It names real organizations and documents, so the claim can be checked.

The Official Research Angle

This material belongs in the official research conversation around wholesale settlement and tokenized deposits. Supporting material comes from the BIS PDF. BIS Working Paper No. 1046, a research document from the organizations involved, states it directly:

> Increasing the CBDC interest rate while holding the IOR rate and the CBDC convenience value fixed raises the deposit rates of both banks, thus bringing their weighted average closer to the IOR rate. Setting the CBDC interest rate equal to the interest rate on reserves would result in full monetary policy pass-through. However, by forcing both banks to raise interest rates, a higher CBDC interest rate makes it more difficult for the small bank to compete with the large bank by offering higher deposit rate.

Why Official Research Matters

For the broader institutional payments and tokenization stack, this matters because it places ecosystem narratives inside the same problems central banks are trying to solve, like settlement speed and risk.

The Research Screenshot

Receipts From The Official Research Trail

• BIS Working Paper No. 1046: https://www.bis.org/publ/work1046.htm
• BIS PDF: https://www.bis.org/publ/work1046.pdf